

Message Text

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INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 /016 R

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DRAFTED BY/ S/S-O: RBELL

APPROVED BY: S/S-O: LMATTESON

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TO USCINCEUR

USNMR SHAPE

S E C R E T STATE 225789

EXDIS MILITARY ADDEES HANDLE AS SPECAT EMCLUSIVE

FOLLOWING REPEAT NATO 5166 ACTION SECSTATE INFO LISBON 22 SEP 75

QUOTE

S E C R E T USNATO 5166

EXDIS

DEPARTMENT PLEASE PASS USCINCEUR AND USNMR SHAPE

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PFOR, NATO, PO, ASEC

SUBJECT: PORTUGAL AND NATO CLASSIFIED INFORMATION

REF: A. STATE 224934 DTG 200057 SEP 75

B. USNATO 5047 DTG 171335Z SEP 75

SUMMARY: SYG LUNS' OFFICE HAS BEEN PLANNING A
ROUTINE LOW-KEY NATO SECURITY INSPECTION IN LISBON
AROUND OCTOBER. THE FINAL DECISION ONWHETHER TO
PROCEED AND TIMING WILL BE TAKEN BY LUNS AFTER
PORTUGUESE AMBASSADOR DE FREITAS CRUZ AND NATO
SECURITY DIRECTOR ABIDIAN DISCUSS THE MATTER

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SHORTLY. ON BASIS OF LATEST PLAN, ONE OR TWO

MEMBERS OF ABIDIAN'S STAFF WOULD CONDUCT THE ACTUAL INSPECTION, RATHER THAN ABIDIAN HIMSELF. MOREOVER, THE INSPECTION WOULD BE DESIGNED TO (A) MEET EXISTING STRINGENT NATO REQUIREMENTS FOR AN ANNUAL INSPECTION, (B) INDICATE TO PORTUGUESE AUTHORITIES CONTINUED NATO INTEREST IN EFFECTIVE SECURITY, AND (C) PROVIDE SOME INDICATION OF PROTECTION ACCORDED NATO CLASSIFIED INFORMATION IN PORTUGAL. IN ACCORDANCE WITH REFTEL A, WE ADVISED LUNS' OFFICE OF US VIEW THAT DECISION TO CONDUCT INSPECTION SHOULD NOT BE TAKEN WITHOUT REVIEW AND CONSULTATION AMONG ALLIES. END SUMMARY.

1. NATO SECURITY DIRECTOR (ABIDIAN) TOLD US SEPTEMBER 22 THAT LATEST PLANS FOR PORTUGUESE SECURITY INSPECTION DID NOT ENTAIL HIS GOING; RATHER THE INSPECTION WOULD BE CONDUCTED BY NATO INSPECTORS FROM HIS OFFICE, AND ABIDIAN'S CURRENT INTENT WAS TO SUGGEST THAT NORWEGIAN AND BELGIAN OFFICER ON SECURITY STAFF COMPROMISE TEAM. HE SAID THAT SYG'S OFFICE HAD AGREED THAT THE INSPECTION SHOULD BE LOW-KEY AND BILLED AS A NORMAL ANNUAL INSPECTION IN COMPLIANCE WITH EXISTING NATO REGULATIONS CONCERNING THE SECURITY OF NATO ATOMAL AND COSMIC INFORMATION (CM(68)41 AND CM(55)15).

ABIDIAN SAID AMBASSADOR

DE FREITAS CRUZ AGREED IN GENERAL WITH THE DESIRABILITY OF A NATO ANNUAL SECURITY INSPECTION IN LISBON, AND IN THEIR DISCUSSIONS JUNE 24 DE FREITAS CRUZ HAD AGREED THAT AN INSPECTION SHOULD BE MADE IN 1975. FURTHER, THEY AGREED THAT EVEN IF A TRULY USEFUL SURVEY OF CONDITIONS IN PORTUGAL WERE NOT POSSIBLE, ABIDIAN WOULD ENDEAVOR TO KEEP THE BASIS OF THE SECURITY SYSTEM THERE ALIVE BY CONDUCTING A LIMITED "NORMAL" ANNUAL INSPECTION WHICH WOULD IN FACT ONLY BE USED TO VERIFY DOCUMENT HOLDINGS AND PROCEDURES, TO CHECK ON ACTUAL CONDITIONS RELATED TO SECURITY OF CLASSI-
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NIED INFORMATION AND TO ADVISE ON PHYSICAL SECURITY MEASURES.

2. ABIDIAN SAID THAT DE FREITAS CRUZ WILL MEET WITH HIM SOON TO FIRM UP THE INSPECTION SCHEDULE. NO DECISION TO HOLD AN INSPECTION OR ITS TIMING WILL BE MADE UNTIL AFTER THE MEETING.

3. WE RAISED WITH ABIDIAN THE CONCERNS EXPRESSED IN REFTEL A, PARTICULARLY WITH REFERENCE TO THE POTENTIALLY COUNTERPRODUCTIVE RESULTS WHICH COULD ARISE FROM SUCH AN INSPECTION. ABIDIAN NOTED THAT FURTHER RESTRICTIONS ON PORTUGAL REGARDING ACCESS TO CLASSIFIED INFORMATION WILL NOT GO UNNOTICED IN LISBON ONCE THE NEW PROCEDURES (REFTELS) ARE PUT INTO EFFECT IN NATO. HE NOTED, FOR EXAMPLE, THAT SENIOR IS OFFICIALS ARE NOW COMPILING A LIST OF COMMITTEES ON WHICH THE PORTUGUESE AUTHORITIES WILL DOUBTLESS LEARN OF THESE NEW RESTRICTIONS ONCE IMPLEMENTED. THUS, IT WOULD BE BETTER IN HIS VIEW TO CARRY ON WITH REGULAR PROCEDURES. FOR THAT REASON, ABIDIAN FELT THAT A LOW-KEY INSPECTION ALSO WOULD BE IN US INTERESTS BECAUSE IT WOULD PROVIDE OPPORTUNITY TO SEE HOW WELL PORTUGUESE ARE PROTECTING WHAT THEY ALREADY HAVE; IT WOULD CONVEY TO THE PORTUGUESE CONTINUING ALLIED INTEREST IN SECURITY OF NATO MATERIALS) AND WOULD ACCORD WITH AGREED NATO SECURITY PROCEDURES.

4. ABIDIAN FAVORS FORMING A TEAM OF TWO STAFF-LEVEL REPRESENTATIVES (BELGIAN AND NORWEGIAN) FROM THE SECURITY DIVISION WHO WOULD GO TO LISBON SOMETIME NEXT MONTH TO CONDUCT THE STRICTLY LOW-KEY INSPECTION. THEY WOULD BE INSTRUCTED TO COMPLETELY AVOID ANY DISCUSSION OF SECURITY POLICY WITH THE PORTUGUESE. ABIDIAN THOUGHT THAT THE TAM REPORT, ONCE CONCLUDED AND SANITIZED, COULD BE MADE AVAILABLE.

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BLE TO THE PORTUGUESE AUTHORITIES. THE UNSANITIZED VERSION WOULD BE FOR THE INFORMATION OF LUNS AND OTHERS WITH WHOM HE WISHED TO SHARE IT.

5. FOLLOWING MEETING WITH ABIDIAN, WE TALKED TO LISSFELT (US)) OF SYG'S OFFICE, IN ABSENCE OF DIRECTOR OF LUNS' CABINET, VAN CAMPEN, AND EXPLAINED PER REP A US CONCERNS AND DESIRE THAT DECISION ON PORTUGUESE SECURITY INSPECTION BE TAKEN ONLY IN CONSULTATION WITH ALLIES.

6. COMMENT: WE SHARE WASHINGTON'S CONCERNS ABOUT PRECIPITATE INSPECTION AND POSSIBILITY IT COULD BE COUNTERPRODUCTIVE. MOREOVER, POSTPONEMENT OF REGULAR ANNUAL INSPECTION UNTIL LATER IN 1975 OR EARLY

1976 OR REASONABLE GROUND WOULD NOT BE DIFFICULT
TO RIG. HOWEVER, GIVEN VALUE OF UNDERSCORING
PROPER NATO SECURITY CONCERNS AGAINST BACKGROUND OF
KNOWLEDGE LISBON SHORTLY WILL HAVE OF PORTUGUESE EXCLUSION
FROM MANY NATO DISCUSSIONS, WE ENVISAGE THAT
LUNS AND SOME ALLIES MAY PREFER TO MOVE AHEAD WITH
LOW-KEY INSPECTION. EXPEIIALLY IF IT WOULD SIGNAL
SECURITY STEPS PORTUGAL WOULD NEED EVENTUALLY TO
TAKE FOR RETURN FULLY TO THE NATO FOLD. SHOULD
DE FREITAS CRUZ AGREE, IT WILL BE THAT MUCH HARDER
FOR US TO RESIST THIS VIEW. HOWEVER, IF DEPARTMENT
CONTINUES TO PREFER THAT WE TEMPORIZE, WE SHUULD
BEGIN NOW WITH LUNS AND OTHER DELEGATIONS TO MAKE
CLEAR WE PREFER TO DEFER INSPECTION. REQUEST GUIDANCE.
END COMMENT.
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UNQUOTE. INGERSOLL

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Message Attributes

Automatic Decaptioning: Z
Capture Date: 01 JAN 1994
Channel Indicators: n/a
Current Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Concepts: ALLIANCE, INFORMATION SECURITY, CLASSIFIED INFORMATION, INFORMATION CONTROL
Control Number: n/a
Copy: SINGLE
Draft Date: 22 SEP 1975
Decaption Date: 28 MAY 2004
Decaption Note: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Action: RELEASED
Disposition Approved on Date:
Disposition Authority: buchant0
Disposition Case Number: n/a
Disposition Comment: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Date: 28 MAY 2004
Disposition Event:
Disposition History: n/a
Disposition Reason:
Disposition Remarks:
Document Number: 1975STATE225789
Document Source: CORE
Document Unique ID: 00
Drafter: O: RBELL
Enclosure: n/a
Executive Order: GS
Errors: N/A
Film Number: D750328-0474
From: STATE
Handling Restrictions: n/a
Image Path:
ISecure: 1
Legacy Key: link1975/newtext/t19750928/aaaaazbj.tel
Line Count: 187
Locator: TEXT ON-LINE, ON MICROFILM
Office: ORIGIN SS
Original Classification: SECRET
Original Handling Restrictions: EXDIS
Original Previous Classification: n/a
Original Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Page Count: 4
Previous Channel Indicators: n/a
Previous Classification: SECRET
Previous Handling Restrictions: EXDIS
Reference: 75 STATE 224934
Review Action: RELEASED, APPROVED
Review Authority: buchant0
Review Comment: n/a
Review Content Flags:
Review Date: 30 APR 2003
Review Event:
Review Exemptions: n/a
Review History: RELEASED <30 APR 2003 by ShawDG>; APPROVED <29 DEC 2003 by buchant0>
Review Markings:

Margaret P. Grafeld
Declassified/Released
US Department of State
EO Systematic Review
06 JUL 2006

Review Media Identifier:
Review Referrals: n/a
Review Release Date: n/a
Review Release Event: n/a
Review Transfer Date:
Review Withdrawn Fields: n/a
Secure: OPEN
Status: NATIVE
Subject: PORTUGAL AND NATO CLASSIFIED INFORMATION
TAGS: PFOR, ASEC, PO, NATO
To: USCINCEUR USNMR SHAPE
Type: TE
Markings: Margaret P. Grafeld Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 06 JUL 2006